Superseded — archived edition of August 6, 2026. This memo is kept as a dated record of what was published on August 6, 2026 and is not maintained. The current edition, with a later valuation date and later public information, is at alphabet/memo.html. Figures below reflect only what was known at the time.
Equity research · internal memorandum · 2026-08-06

Alphabet Inc. (GOOGL)

Six-year segment-driver model with a vintage depreciation schedule. Base year TTM to 2026-06-30, all statement inputs from SEC XBRL.

SHORTConviction 2/318-month horizonEdge: analytical

Spot
$357.94
as of 2026-08-06
Expected value
$243.96
-31.8% vs spot
Risk / reward
1.47 : 1
short framing
Breakeven p(bull)
72%
vs 30% assumed

Thesis

  1. What we thinkThe operating business is compounding above 20%. The reported earnings it produces are not the earnings the capex programme will leave behind.
  2. Why it is not pricedConsensus holds D&A at 4.6% of revenue through 2030 while capex runs at 34.6% of revenue this year. Our vintage schedule reaches 14.0%.
  3. What makes it workD&A is disclosed quarterly. Every print showing it climb toward capex closes the gap. Next print 28 October 2026.
Edge type: analytical. No proprietary information. The edge is that a depreciation schedule built from disclosed capex vintages contradicts the EBIT margin the consensus feed carries, and that contradiction is checkable from public filings every ninety days.

The variant — where we differ from consensus

Fiscal yearOur revenueStreet avgStreet low–highΔPercentileAnalystsOur EBIT mgnStreet EBIT mgn
2026$492bn$495bn489–501-0.7%27th3530.0%32.5%
2027$569bn$606bn574–654-6.1% outsidebelow low3928.4%32.5%
2028$645bn$722bn540–799-10.7%40th3827.3%32.5%
2029$721bn$816bn715–880-11.6%4th2926.5%32.5%
2030$798bn$936bn821–1,010-14.8% outsidebelow low3526.3%32.5%

Why the margins differ: the depreciation schedule

We forecast EBITDA margin — a cash margin driven by mix, pricing and opex — and derive EBIT by subtracting depreciation built from the capex programme, vintage by vintage. Forecasting EBIT margin directly, which both the published consensus feed and most sell-side models do, hides the depreciation assumption inside a single number.

The consensus feed carries D&A at a flat 4.6% of revenue in every year and EBIT margin flat to one decimal place. Alphabet Inc. spent 29.7% of revenue on capex in the last twelve months and depreciated 5.7% — a ratio of 5.2×. Those cannot both persist.
YearRevenueGrowthEBITDA mgnCapexCapex %revD&AD&A %revEBIT mgnFCFF
2026E$492bn22.1%38.5%$170bn34.6%$42bn8.5%30.0%$-10bn
2027E$569bn15.6%39.2%$177bn31.1%$61bn10.8%28.4%$14bn
2028E$645bn13.4%39.8%$173bn26.9%$81bn12.5%27.3%$48bn
2029E$721bn11.9%40.2%$163bn22.6%$99bn13.7%26.5%$89bn
2030E$798bn10.7%40.5%$153bn19.1%$113bn14.2%26.3%$129bn
2031E$873bn9.4%40.7%$148bn17.0%$122bn14.0%26.7%$161bn

How year 1 is anchored

Forecast year 2026 is part history. $80.6bn of capex through Q2 is a filed fact, not an estimate. The remaining 2 quarters are held at the last observed quarterly rate of $44.9bn (2026-06-30), giving $170.4bn for the full year. Freezing the exit rate is deliberately conservative: quarterly capex has risen in each of the last seven quarters, so this assumes the ramp stops today. Anchoring on a trailing-twelve-month ratio instead — the conventional choice — would put the full year below the half-year already reported.

The arithmetic the thesis rests on. Over 2026–2031 this capex path spends $985bn. Our vintage schedule depreciates $518bn of it. The consensus feed, held at 4.6% of revenue, depreciates $189bn — a $329bn gap. By 2031 that is $82bn a year of depreciation the consensus EBIT margin never charges, roughly $5.41 per share of annual earnings. An asset base that produces the consensus D&A figure cannot also absorb the capex the cash flow statement reports.

Note this is a claim about reported earnings, not primarily about discounted value: in an FCFF model depreciation is added back, so a higher charge is close to value-neutral and shows up in the bridge below as a small tax effect. The cash that leaves is capex, and that is anchored on filings above. The depreciation gap matters because it is what the multiple is applied to, and because it is observable every ninety days.

Price-to-value bridge

Contributions are exact Shapley values over all 27 = 128 driver coalitions, so they sum to the total without residual (residual $+0.0000). One-at-a-time sensitivity would not, because DCF driver interactions are large.

Step$/share
Street-calibrated value$167.07
ebitda margin+31.65
revenue-27.57
da pct revenue+19.61
Our base case$190.76
Market price$357.94

The gap from our base case to the market price is not decomposed into drivers, because it is not a forecast disagreement — it is the discount rate and terminal assumptions the market is applying. That is stated below rather than disguised as precision.

What the market is paying for

At $357.94, holding everything else at our base case, the market is paying for either

Revenue CAGR
28.0%
vs our 13.8% base
Terminal EBIT margin
48.6%
vs our 26.7% terminal
Discount rate (WACC)
6.12%
vs our 8.75% build

Scenarios and expected value

CaseValue/sharevs spotProbabilityWACCTerminal gTV % of EVAnchor
Bear$109.76-69.3%25%9.50%2.5%87%consensus dispersion
Base$190.76-46.7%45%8.75%3.0%86%judgment
Bull$435.58+21.7%30%7.25%3.8%90%consensus dispersion
Expected value$243.96-31.8%100%
Street-calibrated (their revenue, EBIT and D&A; our capex, our engine)$167.07-53.3%
Street published price target (median 425, range 350–475)$427.55+19.4%
Bear · 25%

The depreciation catch-up arrives with no offsetting EBITDA margin expansion and Search ad coverage erodes faster than modelled. Held below the base case because Alphabet has beaten EPS in all eight reported quarters and Cloud is currently supply-constrained rather than demand-constrained.

Base · 45%

Modal because the arithmetic is close to mechanical: $985bn of cumulative capex over six years cannot be carried at 4.6% of revenue in D&A under any useful life Alphabet currently discloses. The uncertainty is timing and offsetting margin, not direction.

Bull · 30%

Carries real weight because it embeds the market's own implied ~6.1% discount rate and the possibility that AI capex proves front-loaded rather than permanent. Thirty-nine analysts and a $427 median target sit closer to this case than to ours.

Position sizing

Computed through a constraint cascade, not chosen. Basis: illustrative $1bn book.

TermValueNote
Payoff ratio b1.47reward ÷ risk
p(win)70%probability mass favouring the position
Kelly f49.6%full Kelly fraction
Quarter-Kelly12.39%0.25 × Kelly
Liquidity cap2240.00%20% of ADV over 5 days
Risk-budget cap6.92%1.5% of NAV at risk to the adverse case
Concentration cap5.00%single-name hard limit
Position size5.00% of NAVbinding constraint: concentration cap

Kill criteria

#If this happensObservableThresholdByAction
k1Alphabet extends disclosed server useful life beyond six years
Extending life defers the entire catch-up and breaks the thesis outright.
Property & equipment useful-life disclosure, FY2026 Form 10-K> 6 years2027-02-28exit full
k2FY2027 capex guidance below $110bn
A sharp step down means the build-out was front-loaded and FCF inflects early.
Capex guidance, Q4 FY2026 earnings call< $110bn2027-02-05cut half
k3D&A passes 9% of revenue while EBIT margin holds above 30%
Would mean EBITDA margin is expanding fast enough to absorb the charge.
Depreciation / revenue and operating margin, quarterlyboth true in one quarter2027-07-31cut half
k4Cloud revenue growth below 25% for two consecutive quarters
Our supply-constrained framing would be wrong: demand, not capacity, binds.
Google Cloud segment revenue growth, 10-Q< 25% YoY x22027-04-30review

Catalyst path

DateEventWhat we learnTests
2026-10-28Q3 FY2026 resultsD&A/revenue trajectory, capex guide, Cloud growth and backlogk3, k4
2027-02-05 (tentative)Q4 FY2026 results and Form 10-KFY2027 capex guidance and the useful-life disclosurek1, k2
2027-04-30 (tentative)Q1 FY2027 resultsFirst clean read on whether the depreciation step-up is arrivingk3

What would make us wrong

The strongest case against our own short: Alphabet has beaten EPS in eight consecutive quarters, Cloud is accelerating rather than decelerating, and the AI capex may be buying an option on a materially larger business rather than a commodity compute fleet. Our answer is that none of that is inconsistent with the depreciation arithmetic -- it changes the numerator, not the charge.

Our valuation sits 55% below the Street's median target and below the lowest of 39 published targets. Either we are missing something 39 analysts can see, or the consensus feed carries a margin assumption nobody has re-derived. We think the latter, but the base rate on that judgement is not favourable and the position is sized accordingly.

Pre-mortem

Eighteen months out the position is down 30%. What happened: Alphabet extended server useful lives to eight years in the FY2026 10-K, cutting the annual depreciation charge by roughly a third at a stroke and pushing the catch-up beyond our horizon. At the same time Gemini monetisation lifted Search ad coverage instead of compressing it, and the complex re-rated on a lower discount rate as rates fell. We were right about the arithmetic and wrong about the accounting policy -- the one input management controls directly.

Appendix A — quality of earnings

TTM to 2026-06-30$bnComment
Revenue445.9
Operating income (EBIT)147.633.1% margin
Non-operating income151.650.7% of pretax income
  of which equity-securities gains149.0non-cash marks on investment stakes
Reported net income244.2includes the marks above
NOPAT (EBIT after tax)120.5at 18.4% effective rate
Reported diluted EPS
$19.84
as filed
Economic EPS
$9.79
NOPAT basis
Reported P/E
18.0x
what screens show
Economic P/E
36.6x
what you actually pay

Appendix B — segment build

Every revenue line is the product of named quantities, not a growth rate. Each driver can be disagreed with individually and checked against disclosure.

Segment / driver2026E2027E2028E2029E2030E2031E
Google Search & other ($bn)268300330358387417
  queries+6.5%+5.5%+5.0%+4.5%+4.0%+3.5%
  ad coverage-1.0%-1.5%-1.5%-1.0%-0.5%+0.0%
  price per click+13.0%+8.0%+6.2%+5.0%+4.5%+4.0%
YouTube ads ($bn)465257616568
  watch hours+5.0%+4.5%+4.0%+3.5%+3.0%+3.0%
  ad load+2.0%+1.5%+1.0%+0.5%+0.0%+0.0%
  cpm+7.5%+5.0%+4.0%+3.5%+3.0%+2.5%
Google Network ($bn)292827252423
  runoff-3.0%-4.0%-4.0%-5.0%-5.0%-5.0%
Subscriptions, platforms & devices ($bn)566573829099
  subscribers+14.0%+12.0%+10.0%+9.0%+8.0%+7.0%
  arpu+3.0%+3.0%+2.5%+2.5%+2.0%+2.0%
Google Cloud ($bn)91122156192228263
  capacity+55.0%+34.0%+28.0%+23.0%+19.0%+15.0%
Other Bets ($bn)222334
  growth+10.0%+15.0%+20.0%+20.0%+20.0%+20.0%
Total revenue ($bn)492569645721798873

Appendix C — equity bridge and balance sheet

Item$bnNote
Enterprise value (base case)2,118
+ Cash & marketable securities242.5
+ Equity investments (stakes)124.327.9% of revenue — $10.09/share. Omitted from the published report's bridge.
− Debt100.2
− Operating leases18.0
− Preferred stock18.06.25% mandatory convertible issued June 2026, carrying value. Liquidation preference is $19.0bn. Deducted here rather than converted into the share count; the diluted count already carries ~8m if-converted shares, so the two overlap by well under 0.1%.
Equity value2,348÷ 12,309m diluted shares
Value per share$190.76

Appendix D — sources and method

Known limitations